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Some Legal Aspects of Proposition
Fourteen
By JoHN G. CIAcy* and HowAu) N. N mEovsKI**
Although there are grave questions whether the proposed amend-
ment to the California Constitution is valid under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, we are of the view
that it would be more appropriate to pass on these questions after
the election, should the proposed amendment be adopted, than to
interfere with the power of the people to propose laws and amend-
ments to the Constitution, and to adopt or reject the same at the
polls. (See Cal. Const., art. IV, § 1; Wind v. Hite, 58 Cal. 2d 415,
417.)
The petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Peters, J. and
Tobriner, J. are of the view that the petition should be granted.1
W ITH THOSE WORDS, the California Supreme Court left to the
voters of this State the decision as to whether there ever will be a
final adjudication of the many legal questions raised by Proposition 14.
Lewis v. Jordan arose from a petition for a writ of mandamus to pre-
vent the California Secretary of State from placing Proposition 14 on
the ballot. The petitioner argued that its passage and subsequent
application would violate the federal and California constitutions.
The court's decision to permit a vote on Proposition 14 will afford
the people of California an opportunity to evaluate the serious social
and moral questions which the measure encompasses. The majority
of the public opposition to the measure is based upon the belief that
discrimination in housing is detrimental to the health and growth of
our State and is inherently unjust. In addition, the opponents have
pointed out that, while the avowed purpose of the measure is to repeal
the Rumford Fair Housing Act,2 it would have the much broader harm-
ful effect of permanently foreclosing the legislature and all other arms
of state and local government from acting against discrimination in
housing.
The authors agree without reservation with both of the foregoing
* A.B. 1956, Fordham University; LL.B. 1959, Columbia University; member,
California Bar.0
" B.S.E. 1955, University of Michigan; J.D. 1957, University of Michigan; mem-
ber, California Bar.
I Lewis v. Jordan, Sac. No. 7549, Cal. Sup. Ct., June 3, 1964.
2 CAL. H114La & SAFzTY CODE §§ 35700-44.
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points and realize that the election battle will be fought on basic
moral grounds. However we also believe that it will be helpful for
the bar to be familiar with the more important legal issues raised by
the measure. A brief survey of those legal issues is the sole purpose
of this article.4
The text of the proposed amendment, to be added as section 26
of article I of the constitution of the State of California, reads as
follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny,
limit or abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person who
is willing or desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real
property, to decline to sell, lease or rent such property to such person
or persons as he, in his absolute discretion, chooses.
'Person" includes individuals, partnerships, corporations and
other legal entities and their agents or representatives but does not
include the State or any subdivision thereof with respect to the sale,
lease or rental of property owned by it.
"Real property" consists of any interest in real property of any
kind or quality, present or future, irrespective of how obtained or
financed, which is used,,designed, constructed, zoned or otherwise
devoted to or limited for residential purposes whether as a single
family dwelling or as a dwelling for two or more persons or fumilies
living together or independently of each other.
This Article shall not apply to the obtaining of property by emi-
nent domain pursuant to Article I, Sections 14 and 14Y2 of this
constitution, nor to the renting or providing of any accommodation
for lodging purposes by a hotel, motel or other similar public place
engaged in furnishing lodging to transient guests.
If any part or provision of this Article, or the application thereof
to any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of the
Article, including the application of such part or provision to other
persons or circumstances, shall not be affected thereby and shall
continue in full force and effect. To this end the provisions of this
Article are severable.5
3 The proponents of the measure base their moral case upon the purported invi-
olability of private property rights. Refutation of the claim of inviolability is well artic-
ulated in Powell, The Relationship Between Property Rights and Civil Rights, 15 HAsT-
rs L.J. 135 (1963).
4No attempt is made here to exhaustively analyze all issues raised by Proposition 14.
Further, the general subject of "state action" violative of the fourteenth amendment is
not discussed. That subject has been treated extensively recently by a number of authors
and four of the better works are Lewis, The Meaning of State Action, 60 CoLum. L. Bsv.
1083 (1960); St. Antoine, Color Blindness But Not Myopia: A New Look at State
Action, Equal Protection, and "Private" Racial Discrimination, 59 MIcH. L. BE. 993
(1961); Van Alstyne & Karst, State Action, 14 STAN. L. lsv. 3 (1961); Williams,
The Twilight of State Action, 41 TuxAs L. Rnv. 347 (1963).
5 Proposition 14---"Sales and Rentals of Residential Real Property;" qualified for
ballot February 24, 1964.
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Problems Under the California Constitution
Since Proposition 14, if passed, will be a part of the California
constitution, it is doubtful that it may be invalid because of any conflict
with other substantive provisions of that constitution, as it would
supersede any earlier enacted provisions with which it was in conflict.
Rather, the attacks on the measure based on the California constitution
relate to the procedure set forth in that constitution for its amendment.
There are two attacks. First, that under the rule of McFadden v.
Jordan6 Proposition 14 constitutes a revision of, rather than an amend-
ment to, the California constitution and does not comply with proce-
dures set forth in article XVIII for revision of that instrument.7 Second,
that the measure relates to more than one subject and therefore con-
travenes article IV, section 1c of that constitution, which requires
fthat constitutional amendments "shall relate to but one subject.""
In Livermore v. Waite9 the supreme court enjoined the submission
of a proposed constitutional amendment to the voters. If passed, the
proposed amendment would have deleted a constitutional provision
that Sacramento was the seat of the California government and added
in its stead a provision that San Jose was the governmental seat. How-
ever, it would not have become operative until the State had received
a donation of ten acres of land and one million dollars. The court
held that constitutional amendments must become operative parts of
the constitution upon adoption, and, therefore, the proposed amend-
ment was invalid. In the course of its opinion the court stated, "The
significance of the term 'amendment' implies such an addition or
change within the lines of the original instrument as will effect an
improvement, or better carry out the purpose for which it was famed."'
McFadden v. Jordan" involved a proposed amendment to the
California constitution that was almost half as long as the entire
constitution, and, by the court's own count, would have repealed or
substantially altered fifteen of the twenty-five articles in the consti-
tution. The supreme court enjoined the submission of the proposed
amendment to the voters on the ground that it was a revision of,
rather than an amendment to, the constitution and the revision pro-
cedure had not been complied with. The court quoted the language
above from Livermore and said that rather than fitting within the
6 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
7 CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 2.
8 CAL. CoNsT. art. IV, § 1c.
9 102 Cal. 113, 36 Pac. 424 (1894).
10 Id. at 118-19, 36 Pac. at 426.
1132 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948).
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criteria set forth in that language, the proposed amendment constituted
a revision because the effect of its adoption "would be to substan-
tially alter the purpose and to attain objectives clearly beyond the
lines of the Constitution as now cast." 2
Opponents of the measure, relying on McFadden, say that Propo-
sition 14 would divest California legislature, courts, and executives
of the police power possessed by them under the present constitution
pursuant to which they can deal and have dealt with the field of dis-
crimination in housing. They argue that such a divestiture would
constitute a fundamental change in the purposes and objectives of
the California constitution and would be a revision requiring com-
pliance with the provisions for the adoption*of revisions.
Supporters of Proposition 14, on the other hand, view the measure
as one which does not change any purpose or objective of the consti-
tution, but simply declares that the State shall not interfere with the
right of persons to freely dispose of their property as they choose.
The second procedural argument raised against the measure is
based on the language of the California constitution which provides
that constitutional amendments "shall relate to but one subject.""3
Opponents take the position that the measure most certainly will
result in legal effects beyond those relating to private discrimination
in housing and thereby will clearly affect more than one subject.14
Supporters of the measure stress that these alleged legal effects are
fancied rather than real and are the results of erroneous constructions
of its language. They assert that the subject dealt with by Proposition
14 is simply the right of the owner of real property to sell or not to
sell as he chooses, and therefore there is but one subject embraced
by it.
The California Supreme Court, in denying the petition for a writ
of mandate in Lewis v. Jordan,'5 made no mention of the two pro-
cedural arguments advanced under the California constitution. The
opinion recognized problems only under the fourteenth amendment,
did not discuss or distinguish the McFadden case, and spoke of the
"proposed amendment."' However, the procedural arguments were
not specifically rejected, and it may be expected that, should Propo-
sition 14 be adopted, the court will be called on once again to deal
with those arguments.
12 Id. at 350, 196 P.2d at 799.
Is CAL. CoNST. art. IV, § Ic.
14 See discussion infra p. 17.
15 Sac. No. 7549, Cal. Sup. Ct., June 3, 1964.
16 Id. (Emphasis added.)
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Problems Under the Federal Constitution
A number of arguments based upon the federal constitution have
been raised against Proposition 14. If valid, some would affect it only
as applied to particular fact situations, while others would void the
nieasure in its entirety regardless of any specific applications. The
arguments are discussed below.
Duty of State To Protect Inhabitants Against
Private Discrimination
Opponents of Proposition 14 argue that it is inherently violative
of the fourteenth amendment in that its passage would preclude the
State from protecting those within its jurisdiction against private
infringement of their civil rights. They argue that, although the guar-
anties of the fourteenth amendment are directed against state action,
the state can act by allowing private individuals to infringe such
guaranties. The conclusion urged is that the amendment "fairly im-
ports an obligation on the State to see to it that those over whom it
has control do not bring about what for practical purposes are the
same effects as would be produced by a violation of the Amendment
by the State."1 7 It is argued that "there is no practical difference,
either to the person discriminated against or to the policy of the
nation, whether a denial of constitutional rights on account of race
or color is brought about directly by the State, or, without let from
the State, by the action of private individuals."8
In support of their arguments, opponents of Proposition 14 rely
on several categories of decisions: (a) the so-called "affirmative inte-
gration" cases, which require governmental correction of racial im-
balance in schools even though the imbalance was not caused by
government action;'19 ,(b) the "white primary" cases in which a vio-
lation of the fifteenth amendment was found in the state's failure to
afford Negroes equal voting rights;20 (c) the "custody-protection"
cases in which a duty has been imposed upon state officials to protect
17 Brief of Joseph A. Ball and Herman F. Selvin as Amici Curiae, p. 12, Lewis v.
Jordan, Sac. No. 7549, Cal. Sup. Ct., June 3, 1964.
38 Id. at 13.
19 Branche v. Board of Educ., 204 F. Supp. 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1962); Jackson v.
Pasadena City School Dist., 59 Cal. 2d 876, 382 P.2d 878, 31 Cal. Rptr. 606 (1963).
Contra, Bell v. School City, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 84 Sup. Ct.
1223 (1964) (no affirmative constitutional duty to change innocently arrived at school
districts).
2o Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1§44).
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persons in their custody against injurious acts by private persons. 21
They also rely on Truax v. Corrigan32 which held a state prohibition
against issuance of injunctions in labor disputes to be violative of
both the due process and equal protection guaranties of the fourteenth
amendment.
The opponents rest their argument on the principle that "the right
to be immune from racial discrimination is one of the 'unalienable
rights' guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment."23 They then cite
the following language:
The states are under a duty to make and enforce laws which provide
an individual with an effective remedial process for interference with
his civil rights. The states violate this duty when, through non-action,
they fail to provide such a remedy. This failure is a denial of equal
protection of the laws.24
Critics of the foregoing argument claim that it ignores the legal
limitations on the terms "civil rights" and "constitutional rights." They
state that the Supreme Court long has held that there is no "consti-
tutional right" or "civil right" to be free from private discrimination. 5
Thus it is argued that although the states may have a duty to protect
their citizens against infringement of their constitutional rights, that
duty is only coextensive with the rights being infringed. Any other
conclusion, they add, would accomplish by indirection what the four-
teenth amendment, as interpreted in the Civil Rights Cases,28 does not
accomplish directly.
Critics of the argument also claim that none of the decisions cited
by the opponents are applicable to Proposition 14. They point out that
the "affirmative integration" cases, also known as "de facto segrega-
tion" cases, and the "white primary" cases concern subjects which
are primarily government functions rather than private activities and
thereby fit within the traditional framework of the "state action" prin-
ciple, which is not relevant to Proposition 14. A similar argument is
made with respect to the "custody-protection" cases, in that in each of
such cases the state placed the injured party in a position of jeopardy
21 Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476 (5th Cir. 1951); Catlette v. United States,
132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
22257 U.S. 312 (1921).
28 Brief of Joseph A. Ball and Herman F. Selvin as Amici Curiae, p. 20, Lewis v.
Jordan, Sac. No. 7549, Cal. Sup. Ct., June 3, 1964.
24 Peters, Civil Rights and State Non-Action, 34 NoTRE DAsm LA W. 303, 328
(1959).
25 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
26 Ibid.
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and prevented his escape of his own volition. Thus the failure of the
state to protect him from that jeopardy constitutes "state action."
The Truax27 decision is sought to be distinguished on several
grounds. First, the Court laid great stress upon the inherent illegality
of the private action immunized by the legislation then under review.
Second, the Court was greatly concerned with the legislature's attempt
to destroy a traditional common law remedy. Third, the Court, dis-
approving the limitation of the application of the statute to labor
disputes, found that limitation to be a "purely arbitrary and capricious
exercise" of the power of the state.28 Further, it has been argued that
the dissents in the Truax case are more powerful and well reasoned
than the majority opinion.29
Finally, critics of the argument claim that the opponents' theory,
if carried to its logical conclusion, would invalidate the current excep-
tions in the Rumford Act30 and similar legislation, since the State in
those cases has denied protection against private discrimination to
those desiring housing in the exempted classes of dwellings. Similarly,
they say that the opponents' argument leads to the conclusion that it is
unconstitutional for a state not to have any fair housing law at all.
State Authorization of Private Discrimination
A second constitutional argument raised against Proposition 14 is
that its passage would violate the equal protection guaranty of the
fourteenth amendment. The argument depends upon the assumption
that the measure "sanctions" or "encourages" private discrimination
and thereby constitutes state action.
Opponents of Proposition 14 state that the nexus with the State in
the instant case is sufficient to contravene the fourteenth amendment.
They cite an early Supreme Court case, McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry.,3 ' in which the Court examined a state statute which permitted
railroad companies to provide sleeping, dining, and chair cars only to
white travelers. The Court stated that the carrier, in denying such
facilities to Negroes, would have been acting under "the authority of
27257 U.S. 312 (1921).
281d. at 329.
29 In Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination in "Pri-
vate" Housing, 52 CA=ls. L. REv. 1, 9 (1964) the author comments on the Truax deci-
sion, stating "its holding on the constitutional issue which was involved is no longer
sound...."0 See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFET CODE § 35720(5) exempting dwellings with
four units or less from the Act.
31 235 U.S. 151 (1914).
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a state law,"32 and thereby would have been violating the fourteenth
amendment. It is urged that Proposition 14 is analogous to the statute
in the McCabe case because it authorizes private discrimination, and
consequently such discrimination would be under the authority of
state law.
The case of Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority" is also cited
in opposition to the measure. In Burton the Court reviewed a Dela-
ware statute which provided that a restaurant could refuse to serve
"persons whose reception or entertainment 
. . . would be offensive
to the major part of [its] customers." 4 Mr. Justice Stewart, in a con-
curring opinion, took the position that the Delaware Supreme Court,
in upholding a restaurant operator's right to deny service to the appel-
lant solely because of his race, had relied upon that statute. He then
stated, "The highest court of Delaware has thus construed this legis-
lative enactment as authorizing discriminatory classification based
exclusively on color. Such a law seems to me clearly violative of the
Fourteenth Amendment."35 Justices Harlan, Whittaker, and Frank-
furter, in dissenting, stated that if they could agree that the Delaware
court had construed the statute as authorizing discriminatory classi-
fication based exclusively on color rather than as a mere declaration
of the common law, they would reverse on the ground stated by Mr.
Justice Stewart. Justice Frankfurter stated, "For a State to place its
authority behind discriminatory treatment based solely on color is
indubitably a denial by a State of the equal protection of the laws in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment."3 6
Thus, two members of the present Court who did not join in the
majority's ground37 for decision would have found state action where
a statute was interpreted as authorizing or permitting discrimination
rather than as a mere restatement of the common law. Perhaps, then,
had the majority been able to read the Delaware court opinion in the
same light as Mr. Justice Stewart, they too would have agreed with
him.
It is argued, then, that the Supreme Court would interpret Propo-
sition 14 as an authorization by the State to private persons to dis-
criminate solely on the basis of race.38 In support of this contention, it
321d. at 162.
3365 U.S. 715 (1961).
34Id. at 726 (concurring opinion).
35 Id. at 726-27 (concurring opinion).
86 Id. at 727 (dissenting opinion).
37 See p. 14 infra.
38 Opponents of the measure also cite the "white primary" cases, cited note 19
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is argued that the context of the enactment of the measure, as shown
by the campaign statements made on both sides, demonstrates that the
enactment would be for the purpose of authorizing private discrimina-
tion. It is also argued that the obvious effect of the measure will be
private discrimination and that this demonstrates its purpose. It is
asserted that legislation, however fair on its face, may be shown by the
context of its enactment or by its practical effect to be designed for the
purpose of denying constitutionally protected rights and therefore to
be unlawful state action. 9
Supporters of Proposition 14 reply that its passage would merely
be a declaration of neutrality by the State with respect to private
discrimination. They state that neither the measure itself, nor com-
bined with any other planned or likely action by the State, demands,
effects, brings about or even encourages racial or other discrimination.
They argue that the measure accomplishes nothing more than would
the repeal of the Rumford Act, which repeal would not violate the
fourteenth amendment.4 0 Further, they urge an interpretation of the
measure as being a mere declaration of the common law and take
refuge in the characterization of the Delaware law by Justices Harlan,
Whittaker, and Frankfurter in the Burton case.
Supporters also reply that there is a general proposition of law
which is aptly stated by Mr. Justice Cardozo that "there is a wise and
ancient doctrine that a court will not inquire into the motives of a legis-
lative body or assume them to be wrongful."41 They argue that the
cases cited by the opponents do not contradict this doctrine because
they all involve measures which, either on their face or in their obvious
effect, were designed to accomplish improper legislative ends. Proposi-
tion 14, they argue, clearly does not involve either situation. They
argue further that in none of the cited cases was the "motive" of the
legislature examined by reference to statements of individual legis-
lators. They urge that to impute to the electorate approving Proposi-
tion 14 a purpose of discrimination on the basis of inflammatory cam-
supra, as establishing that a state "acts" in violation of the fourteenth amendment when
it permits private organizations to discriminate against Negroes. However, the organiza-
tions in those cases were performing a governmental function, i.e., holding elections.
89 See Griffin v. County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964); Comillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Avery v. Georgia, 345 U.S. 559 (1953); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S.
268 (1939); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935); Child Labor Tax Case,
259 U.S. 20 (1922); Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915).
40 But see Henkin, Shelley v. Kraemer: Notes for a Revised Opinion, 110 U. PA.
L. REv. 473, 483 n.20 (1962) suggesting that it may be state action contravening the
fourteenth amendment when a state repeals existing antidiscrimination legislation.
4 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 299 (dissenting opinion).
Angus%, 1964]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
paign statements is absurd reasoning, wholly unsupported by prior
judicial decision.
Another approach to the argument that the State would be "sanc-
tioning" private discrimination and thus "acting" requires the artful
utilization of the doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer.42 That case involved
a Negro who purchased real property from an owner in violation of
a private racially restrictive covenant. The Court held that a state
court would be engaging in state action prohibited by the fourteenth
amendment if it enforced the private covenant so as to void the Negro's
title. The Shelley case has been interpreted in Abstract Inv. Co. v.
Hutchinson48 as meaning that the granting of judgment for the
plaintiff-lessor in an unlawful detainer action without hearing the
defendant-lessee's allegation that the real purpose of the action was
racial discrimination would constitute state action similar to that pro-
hibited by Shelley. It is argued that an action brought after the passage
of Proposition 14 based upon the Rumford or Unruh Acts could not
be defended on the ground that passage of the measure had nullified
those statutes because the court's recognition of such a defense would
be state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment. Proponents
of the measure counter that such an argument could as logically be
applied to a suit brought in a state which did not grant affirmative
rights to plaintiffs under nondiscrimination statutes. They argue that
it would be absurd to hold that dismissal of the suit in such a state
would be state action in violation of the fourteenth amendment.
Authorization of Discrimination by Quasi-Governmental
Parties
A third federal constitutional argument raised against the measure
is that it can be applied to permit discrimination by parties so closely
connected to the State that their discrimination constitutes "state
action."44 Opponents of Proposition 14 point out that the measure
exempts the State (and its subdivisions) only insofar as it is a "person'
and "person" in the context of the measure means "party to the
discriminatory transaction." Further, the subject of the transaction,
"real property," remains the subject "irrespective of how obtained
or financed." Thus the State may be related to a discriminatory trans-
action in any way other than as a party, e.g., as the lessor of "real
property." The measure arguably would permit the State's lessee to
42 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
43204 Cal. App. 2d 242. 22 Cal. Rptr. 309 (1962).
44 See generally Horowitz, Fourteenth Amendment Aspects of Racial Discrimination
in "Private" Housing, 52 CALwi. L. REv. 1 (1964).
[Vol. 16
August, 1964] PROPOSITION FOURTEEN
discriminate with respect to the sale, sublease or rental of the lease-
hold interest. And, if the initiative is viewed as limiting contractual
relationships, the State might even be prevented from inserting a
nondiscrimination clause in the lease.
It is well established law that discrimination against persons on
account of their race violates the fourteenth amendment when such
discrimination is exercised in connection with state-owned property.45
Drafters of the measure obviously recognized that principle, and
they sought to exempt such property from the operation of the measure.
However, the opposition urges that the drafters did an incomplete
job and that, as a result, the measure is subject to attack as applied
to certain private parties acting in quasi-public status.
For example, in Ming v. Horgan.4 it was held that a private
developer who was licensed and inspected by the State and who, as
advertised, secured for purchasers of his homes mortgage financing
guaranteed by the FHA, was required under the fifth and fourteenth
amendments to pursue a policy of nondiscrimination. The court rea-
soned that by virtue of the benefits enjoyed by the developer as a
result of federal and State participation, the project should be treated
as one conducted by the federal and State governments themselves
and subject to the same nondiscrimination requirements. This holding
would appear equally applicable whether State or federal financing
was involved.47 Authority to the contrary such as Dorsey v. Stuyvesant
45New Orleans City Park Improvement Assoc. v. Detiege, 358 U.S. 54 (1958)
(parks); Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (busses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S. 879 (1955) (golf courses); Baltimore Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350
U.S. 877 (1955) (beaches); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (schools).
46 3 B cE E L. L. IRP. 693 (Cal., Super. Ct. 1958).
47 Executive Order No. 11063, 27 Fed. Reg. 11527 (1962), contemplates that
private real estate developers whose projects have in whole or in part been assisted by
the federal government will enter into agreements requiring them to pursue a nondis-
criminatory policy. It has been argued that Proposition 14 would prohibit a California
court from enforcing such obligations if an action based thereon was brought by either
the United States or a third party beneficiary. In such circumstances, the refusal of the
California court to act might violate the doctrine of Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
That case held that a refusal by a state court to entertain a federally-created right of
action violated the supremacy clause of the federal constitution. Supporters of the
measure argue that California courts would not be prohibited from enforcing such
contractual rights by Proposition 14, because the developers, by entering into such
contracts, would thereby have waived their right to exercise their "absolute discretion"
as to whom to sell or rent. The effect upon Executive Order No. 11063 of section 602
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (July 2, 1964)
is not clear. Section 602 expressly excludes from the term "Federal financial assistance,"
a "contract of insurance or guaranty" such as in FHA and VA programs. The exclusion
could be interpreted to prohibit the cognizant executive agencies from promulgating
and enforcing anti-discrimination programs with respect to FHA and VA projects.
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Town Corp.48 is arguably no longer valid law in view of Burton v.
Wilmington Parking Authority.49 In Burton the state agency owned
real property and leased part of the premises to a private lessee who
operated a restaurant therein. The lessee discriminated in his service
on the basis of race; the Court held that the action of the lessee was
the action of the state and therefore a denial of the equal protection
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment. The majority opinion
stated:
By its inaction . . . the State, has not only made itself a party to
the refusal of service, but hag elected to place its power, property
and prestige behind the admitted discrimination. The State has so
far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with Eagle
[lessee] that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the
challenged activity .... 80
The potential breadth of the Burton case is illustrated by the
recent case of Simkins v. Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. 1 The
court held that the state's involvement in the federal Hill-Burton Act8 2
subjected participating "private" hospitals to the fourteenth amend-
ment's ban on racial discrimination. The court found state action in
the fact that the "hospitals operate as integral parts of comprehensive
joint or intermeshing state and federal plans or programs designed to
effect a proper allocation of available medical and hospital resources
for the best possible promotion and maintenance of public health."53
Although the court was careful to say that not "every subvention by
the federal or state government automatically involves the beneficiary
in 'state action,' "4 it is not difficult to find the same involvement by the
state and federal governments in redevelopment, urban renewal, and
other real property programs.
Even more recently decided was Eaton v. Grubbs.5 That case held
that a corporation which operated a hospital under a grant of the
hospital building and land from the state pursuant to a deed which
provided for reversion to the state in the event the hospital was not
maintained was so closely connected to the state that its action should
be considered state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. The
court pointed out that the state had supplied construction funds for
48 299 N.Y. 512, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 981 (1950).
49 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
50 id. at 725.
51323 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1963) (en bane), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 938 (1964).
5260 Stat. 1040 (1946), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1958).
53 323 F.2d at 967.
54 Ibid,
55 329 F.2d 710 (4th Cir. 1964) (en bane).
[Vol. 16
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the expansion of the hospital plant, had continued to provide for its
operational needs, had granted it a tax exemption, and had granted
the hospital corporation the power of eminent domain.
Opponents of Proposition 14 suggest that unless one is prepared
to say that clearing slums is less of a public purpose or less related
to the maintenance of public health, the difference between hospitals
and housing projects is constitutionally insignificant. They argue that
the specific language of the initiative measure would immunize dis-
crimination by any "person" who is a beneficiary of the public largesse
no matter how extensive and no matter how much of a public func-
tion the beneficiary was in fact carrying out. In their view the measure
would apply to situations which are constitutionally indistinguishable
from the Burton and Simkins cases.
Opponents of the measure offer still more examples of constitu-
tionally offensive applications of its terms to quasi-state entities. They
claim that under the measure a company town would be permitted
to discriminate with respect to the renting or leasing of any "real
property" in the town, and that such action would be state action and
violative of the equal protection clause.58 Further, the modem co-
operative apartment house or the condominium are claimed to en-
compass many of the quasi-governmental functions of the company
town, especially if developed on a large scale. The extensive powers
given large tract developers in building complete communities are
argued to verge on the governmental function, especially where aided
by powers of eminent domain.
Supporters of Proposition 14 reply that the measure is to be inter-
preted consistently with the fourteenth amendment and will not permit
a property owner to pursue a discriminatory policy if he is prohibited
from doing so by the dictates of the fourteenth amendment.
Interpretation by the Courts
The interpretation of the breadth of Proposition 14 undoubtedly
will be undertaken by the California courts.5  It also would appear
that under the abstention principle it will be for the California courts
in the first instance to determine whether the measure is simply an
expression of neutrality on the part of the State or whether it is an
affimative statement of a policy of permissive discrimination based
5 Cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
5 7 See NAACP v. Bennett, 360 U.S. 471 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167,
176 (1959); City of Meridian v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 358 U.S. 639 (1959);
Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Note, Federal Jurisdiction:
Recent Developments in the Abstention Doctrine, 47 CAuwF. L. REv. 943 (1959).
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on race. If it is interpreted to be such an affirmative statement and
is therefore held to be on its face violative of the fourteenth amend-
ment, there should be no need for further inquiry. If the measure is
not held to be unconstitutional on its face, the next inquiry of the
court will be whether it is unconstitutional as applied in specific
situations. When faced with the possible application of the measure
in an unconstitutional manner the court may adopt a narrow interpre-
tation in order to avoid the constitutional question. Under such an
interpretation the measure would be deemed to apply only to those
factual situations where its application would not violate the four-
teenth amendment.
The attitude of the California courts toward the construction of
statutory (and presumably State constitutional) provisions" is ex-
pressed in the early case of French v. Teschemaker.5 9 The court stated:
where the language used is unambiguous, and the meaning clear
and obvious, an unconstitutional consequence cannot be avoided by
forcing upon it a meaning, however plausible it may be, which is,
upon a fair test, repugnant to its terms. But if the language upon
its face is ambiguous and susceptible of different constructions, it
may be forced, so to speak, to the extent of adopting the less obvious
construction, in order to uphold the law. All doubts are to be resolved
in favor of and not against the validity of the statute.60
Characterization of language as clear and unambiguous oh its
face will of course vary from judge to judge, and the tests quoted
may be used to justify almost any form of construction except in a
few instances where the language of the statute is utterly clear. Thus
in the French case a State statute provided that a municipality would
not be liable for the debts of a corporation in which it subscribed
stock. The statute was read as limited to a direction that such excep-
tion from liability be obtained by contract between the municipality
and the corporation rather than as a rule of law which admittedly
would have been unconstitutional. In County of Los Angeles v. Riley6'
a State statute granted tax money to municipalities but failed to re-
strict the use of such money to State purposes. It was admittedly
unconstitutional unless a limitation to State purposes could be read
into the statute. The court, quoting from County of Los Angeles v.
5 8 The California Supreme Court has stated that the presence of a severability
clause is an invitation to the reviewing court to construe a measure to be constitutional.
In re Blaney, 30 Cal. 2d 643, 655, 184 P.2d 892, 900 (1947). Proposition 14 contains a
severability clause.
5924 Cal. 518 (1864).
60 Id. at 554.
616 Cal. 2d 625, 59 P.2d 139 (1936).
[VCol. 16
PROPOSITION FOURTEEN
Legg,6 ' read in the limitation, stating: "If the terms of a statute are by
a fair and reasonable interpretation capable of a meaning consistent
with the requirements of the Constitution, the statute will be given
that meaning, rather than another in conflict with the Constitution."63
Under the foregoing principle Proposition 14 may be read as a
command to the State and its subdivisions and agencies not to deny,
limit or abridge only such "rights to discriminate" as persons may
possess under the federal constitution. Thus, if the fourteenth amend-
ment requires a particular property owner to pursue a non-discrimina-
tory policy, actions against him will not be barred by the measure
because that owner will have no "right to discriminate." Stated dif-
ferently, the measure may be read as immunizing discrimination only
by persons presently prevented from doing so solely by State law. It is
obvious that as a practical matter the result will be the same whether
the measure is interpreted not to apply to those prohibited from
discriminating by the fourteenth amendment or is held to be uncon-
stitutional as so applied.
Practical Legal Effects
Opponents of the measure have argued that if it is not struck down
as unconstitutional it will have disruptive commercial effects far be-
yond those contemplated by its proponents. The authors doubt that
the courts will interpret the measure so broadly as to produce the
anticipated results. However, regardless of the final outcome, enter-
prising defense counsel may seek refuge in the measure in a variety
of cases. Until every such effort has been rejected by the courts, areas
of legal doubt and confusion may exist. The final portion of this article
briefly discusses some of the possible disruptive commercial effects.
It has been suggested that Proposition 14 will destroy mutuality
of contract, thereby preventing specific enforcement of real estate
contracts. Civil Code section 3386 prevents either party to a contract
from compelling the other party to specifically perform it unless the
party seeking enforcement has performed or is compellable specifically
to perform. 4 It is argued that if a real property owner enters into an
02 5 Cal. 2d 349, 55 P.2d 206 (1936).
63 6 Cal. 2d at 629, 59 P.2d at 141. See also Shealor v. City of Lodi, 23 Cal. 2d 647,
145 P.2d 574 (1944).64 "Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it, unless
the other party thereto has performed, or is compellable specifically to perform, every-
thing to which the former is entitled under the same obligation, either completely or
nearly so, together with full compensation for any want of entire performance." CAL.
Civ. CoDE § 3386.
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agreement with a buyer or enters into a lease and then decides to
abrogate his agreement, he will be able to do so under the measure.
Similarly it is argued that the absence of mutuality should prevent
the seller or lessor from enforcing the agreement ,against an unwilling
buyer or tenant. Critics of this argument suggest that the courts will
interpret the measure so that any property owner who enters into an
agreement either will be deemed to have waived his "right to decline"
or to have thereby constructively sold, leased or rented his property
at the time of execution so as to have no further property right to
sell, lease or rent.
Under Probate Code sections 780-85 real estate assets of a decedent
must be sold to the highest responsible bidder. It has been argued
that Proposition 14 would vitiate the applicable Probate Code sections
and would remove all power of the probate court to force an executor
to sell to anyone whom he chooses to reject. Such a result might pre-
vent the decedent's heirs from getting top dollar for estate property,
and opponents of the measure assert that its passage would discourage
attendance by potential bidders at probate sales. Critics of this argu-
ment suggest that it is subject to the same fatal defects as the preced-
ing argument.
Civil Code section 2362(1) now requires a public auctioneer to
sell only to the highest bidder, in the absence of special authorization. 5
Proposition 14 has been interpreted by its opponents as removing
that obligation with respect to real property. They claim that confi-
dence in-and attendance at-auctions will thereby diminish signifi-
cantly. In rebuttal, it has been argued that once the auctioneer is
engaged the owner has granted him the sole power to sell or refuse to
sell, and that no auctioneers will risk destruction of their institution by
reneging on their obligation to sell to the highest bidder.
Opponents of the measure have suggested that since it will permit
an owner-principal to refuse to sell to a willing buyer whom the broker
has obtained the broker's commission will be in jeopardy. On the other
hand it has been argued that the danger appears to be non-existent in
fact, since either by express provision in the listing agreement* or by
implied contract the broker could protect his right to recover his
commission upon his presentation to the owner of a willing and able
buyer.
Since a security interest related to a real estate loan also consti-
05 "An auctioneer, in the absence of special authorization or usage to the contrary,
has authority from the seller, only as follows: 1. To sell by public auction to the highest
bidder .... " CAL. Crv. CoDE § 2362(1).
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tutes "real property," (although a more limited interpretation of the
definition of real property set forth in the measure is possible) oppo-
nents of the measure argue that prospective mortgagors may be free
to renege on their commitments to borrow and, as a result of Civil
Code section 3386, prospective lenders may be afforded the same op-
portunity to renege because of lack of mutuality of loan agreements. 66
Critics of this argument state that it is no different from nor more
valid than the argument with respect to real property contracts and
probate sales.
It has also been argued that passage of Proposition 14 would deny
California access to all future federal urban renewal funds and result
in a serious blow to the development of California cities. Both the
Administrator 67 and the General Counsel6 of the Federal Housing and
Home Finance Agency have stated that in their opinions there would
be "serious questions" regarding future urban renewal programs in
California if Proposition 14 is passed. Regulations promulgated by the
Urban Renewal Administration pursuant to Executive Order 1106369
require state and local public agencies, as a condition to receiving
urban renewal assistance, to agree to impose nondiscrimination require-
ments in deeds to private developers. It is argued that Proposition 14
would prohibit such agencies from imposing such requirements be-
cause it would prevent them from "limiting" the "absolute discretion"
of the private developers; therefore, the Urban Renewal Administra-
tion could not provide financial assistance.
It is argued in rebuttal that although the literal language of the
measure would appear to prohibit local public agencies from imposing
such requirements, it would be interpreted to mean that there was no
'imitation" by the public agency of the developer's "absolute discre-
tion" where the developer agreed to accept such conditions in order
to enjoy the benefits of the project. Further, it is suggested that the
fourteenth amendment may render the measure inapplicable under the
reasoning discussed in an earlier part of this article.
Conclusion
It is probable that many members of the general public will look
to the bar for advice and assistance in evaluating Proposition 14. In
66 See note 62 supra.
6 7 Letter from Administrator Robert C. Weaver to Congressman Augustus F.
Hawkins, Jan. 16, 1964.
68 Letter from General Counsel Milton P. Serner to Charles E. Bosley, Administra-
tive Assistant to Senator Clair Engle, March 13, 1964.
69 See note 47 supra.
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fact, some local bar associations have spoken out in opposition to it,"
and even more recently the Conference of Delegates of the State Bar
of Califorma overwhelmingly voted approval of a measure recording
their opposition to the measure. Other associations have remained
silent, apparently because the measure has been viewed solely as
raising "politicar' or "morar' issues. The preceding discussion should
dispel that illusion. While it may be proper for a bar association to
refuse to commit itself to support of or opposition to Proposition 14
when its membership is split on the moral aspects of the measure
(which propriety the authors do not necessarily concede), it is sub-
mitted that every bar association m the State should inform their local
communities about those aspects of the measure which are peculiarly
within the area of competence of attorneys, i.e., the effect of the
measure upon existing State and local law and upon future legislative
and executive programs, and the practical legal effects which might
result from passage of the measure. The authors hope that this article
will be of some assistance in this regard.
7 0 Palo Alto Bar Association; San Mateo County Bar Association; Santa Clara County
Bar Association.
